Newscenter Media News General Michael E Langley, a four-star general in the United States Marine Corps, is the sixth person to hold the role of Commander of the US military’s Africa Command (Africom). He spoke to defenceWeb in an exclusive interview before he steps away from the military after four decades of distinguished service, and a new Africom Commander steps in.
Langley’s tenure at Africom has shaped not only the trajectory of US defence engagement across the continent, but also the evolving contours of modern defence diplomacy — from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea.
His 40-year career is a record of global deployment, strategic recalibration, and a steady leadership ethos. From the moment he joined the Marine Corps, Langley’s journey has embodied transformation: of the force, of international partnerships, and of how the United States engages with Africa.
Langley, who assumed command of Africom in 2022, has been responsible for all US military operations and partnerships across Africa — a continent now at the nexus of global competition, rising insecurity, and shifting alliances.
“This is 40 years in the Marine Corps,” Langley told me, referencing his 18 May service milestone. “And I go back to that day in 1985 when my sister and brother put on my lieutenant bars and I embarked on a mission to be the best officer that I could be inside the United States Marine Corps.”
North African partnerships
In the time we had together, I asked General Langley not only to reflect on his legacy but also to walk me—region by region—through the Africom’s strategic approach to the continent. We began in North Africa, a region often overlooked in broader geopolitical commentary, but one that Langley has long regarded as essential to Africom’s mission.
“Sometimes I refer to North Africa as the Maghreb,” he said. “There’s a necessity for Africom to maintain relationships from Morocco all the way through Libya—maintaining and deepening those partnerships across the shared goals of stability and security.”
I asked him about Africom’s assessment and any shifts in strategy over the first five months of 2025. Langley emphasised Africom’s long-standing ties. He described North Africa as a critical region for Africom, emphasising the importance of maintaining and deepening partnerships with countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and others.
“And as you know both Morocco and Tunisia or non-NATO allies. We have a storied history all the way back to our founding fathers — those two countries partnering with us for shared national security interests.”
Nevertheless, 2025 brought new developments and success with Algeria. “We consider them a partner. We signed a non-binding defence cooperation agreement [Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)]. I went to Algeria, sat down with [General Said] Chengriha, we were able to agree — our departments agreed; first of all, our countries agreed — to look forward and deepen our partnership. So General Chengriha and I signed a non-binding agreement there. That marked a lot of hope.”
Langley noted that despite regional headwinds — especially global tensions following the 7 October 2023 Hamas-Israel conflict — Africom was able to maintain equilibrium in its Maghreb partnerships.
“Globally, that would stress some of our relationships, but not across the Maghreb. We’ve been able to work these countries for our shared interests: counterterrorism, trying to reduce mass migration, and the other threats and challenges they contend with.”
He also cited the Phoenix Express maritime exercise as an important signal of military cooperation across countries in the region, involving not only Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria but also both Libyan authorities—the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Libyan National Army (LNA). “All those countries were involved — Libya, both the east and the west — the GNU and LNA — and Tunisia and Algeria and Morocco. A maritime exercise, Phoenix Express. We were able to work together,” Langley said.
Throughout our discussion of the Maghreb, Langley remained focused on one key concept: balance. Despite a fragmented regional picture, Africom has managed to sustain what he described as “shared goals” and a mutual desire for stability — sometimes in the face of wider geopolitical friction.
Deteriorating security in the Sahel and West Africa
From North Africa, our conversation turned to the Sahel and coastal West Africa — regions where security challenges are intensifying and strategic coordination is fraying. Langley offered a sobering assessment of the deteriorating regional architecture that once supported stability across the Sahel.
“That large security construct from 2022… has regressed. Matter of fact, it is non-existent anymore,” Langley said.
From Chad westward through Mauritania and down into Burkina Faso, Langley described the erosion of collaborative structures, particularly the collapse of the G5 Sahel framework and the weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that once included Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad.
“Even that has dissolved or regressed significantly because of the upstart of a lot of these terrorist organisations.”
On the security environment in Burkina Faso, his response was direct. Langley said, “You have a number of factions — from JNIM to ISIS-Sahel — that are dominating, influencing, or even controlling a wide swath of territory. Almost 40 to 50% in Burkina Faso.”
Niger, he said, is working hard to prevent that same instability from spreading further. “They want to make sure it doesn’t spread there. They have established a security construct called the AES… They call it a joint force.”
In Langley’s view, their success could be pivotal. “If they win, everyone wins. If they win, West Africa wins. The Sahel wins.”
He emphasised the importance of bilateral cooperation among African partners to push back against terrorist movements and prevent extremist groups from moving toward coastal states. “I encourage all of them to do bilateral-type coordination…because the intent of what I see—especially with the ISIS factions—[intent] to move to the coast, to West Africa.”
A helping hand
Langley affirmed Africom’s work with African countries, including with those like Côte d’Ivoire and Benin but underlined that this support remains grounded in respect for sovereignty. “We don’t impose ourselves — Africom — on them. We still engage, and we’re here to help.”
He said the new direction guiding Africom’s engagement came directly from US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth. “Just by what Secretary Hegseth told me to move forward with: To still engage with these countries on our shared objectives of countering terrorism but get them to the point where they hit benchmarks and institutional capacity, independent operations, not dependence.”
Langley recalled and clarified the shift in framework. “From 2022, when we had a whole-of-government [approach] — defence, diplomacy, and development — it has kind of emanated [from] what the NSS used to tell us to do: African-led, US-enabled. But now, there are some benchmarks in it to get to their independent operations.”
For Langley, the path forward in the Sahel and West Africa is neither idealistic nor prescriptive. It rests on practical partnerships, mutual respect, and realistic progress — allowing African countries to lead while Africom supports deliberately and carefully.
Instability in Central Africa
As we shifted our discussion to Central Africa, General Langley described a region marked by complexity, kinetic threats, and fragile diplomatic gains. I asked him to assess the evolving dynamics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the broader Great Lakes region, where violent extremist organisations, such as ISIS-DRC, continue to exploit instability and weak governance, in parallel to Alliance Fleuve Congo-March 23 Movement’s incursions into the DRC.
He acknowledged the multifaceted nature of the threats, saying plainly, “It’s very complicated in that region.”
Langley pointed to the continued spread and resilience of ISIS-affiliated groups in eastern DRC and in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. “ISIS-DRC, and that influence — and also ISIS-Mozambique — is still emanating and growing, and we’re watching that,” he said.
With the DRC preoccupied by AFC-M23 armed activity since late 2024, Langley described how the region’s ability to mount a coordinated response to ISIS-DRC has been constrained. He noted that countries like Uganda are stepping up, but broader regional alignment remains necessary.
“Uganda is really stepping it up to address that issue, but other countries will have to fold into that to include the DRC. But you know, of course, they have the M23 fight right now.”
Langley also highlighted the growing importance of dialogue with regional actors through forums such as the recent African Chiefs of Defence Conference (ACHoD). “At the ACHoD conference, I was able to talk with representatives from Rwanda, from Burundi as well, and the DRC. So that conversation continues.”
Langley reiterated how he engaged with defence leaders at the ACHoD — in “breakout sessions by region. That’s something they were very happy [about] that Africa and Kenya got everyone together and had an additive to the ACHoD conference.”
An economy of force
But it’s not just about high-level diplomacy. Langley stressed that Africom’s presence and posture in Central Africa are deliberately limited, given the region’s political sensitivities. “It’s kind of an economy of force for us — engaging with these countries.”
While acknowledging that US forces are not operating in large numbers in the area, he emphasised the need to stay alert and flexible — particularly to ensure the security of US embassies and personnel on the ground.
“We watch indications and warnings; especially from the perspective of protecting our missions there to ensure that I can respond to crisis if one of the embassies needs us because of a security situation that could erode from that.”
The threats may not receive as much global attention as in the Sahel or Horn, but Langley made it clear: the risks in Central Africa are not peripheral. From coordination challenges to violent extremist resilience, the region’s security landscape remains volatile. Yet through bilateral engagement and selective diplomatic pressure, Africom continues to track developments closely—quietly working to prevent further deterioration.
Horn of Africa a key Africom focus
Turning east, I asked General Langley to share his assessment of the Horn of Africa — particularly Somalia, where Africom has ramped up airstrikes in 2025. The region remains one of Africom’s most enduring areas of engagement due to the persistent threat posed by violent extremist organisations. I asked him to clarify why there had been a noticeable uptick in US operations there.
“When the Secretary of Defence gave me the mission, the number one priority — on the continent of Africa — [was] counter the terrorism that has the most propensity at this time to attack our homeland,” Langley explained.
He zeroed in on the ISIS network operating in northern Somalia’s Puntland region—an area that has, in his view, grown increasingly capable of orchestrating transnational operations.
“Therein lies a caliphate that’s expanding or controlling within North Somalia; that has demonstrated a global network — whether it’s funding and movement. I call it the four Rs.”
Langley defined those four Rs as resources, revenue, refuge, and recruiting — a framework he has observed since 2022. While ISIS in Somalia remains smaller than al-Shabaab in scale, its capacity to link with global financial and logistical networks has made it a top US concern. “Those numbers are going up,” he warned.
I followed up by asking him whether Africom was supporting Somali-led operations, or if US forces were taking the lead in some strikes. I also posed a strategic question: could another country respond faster than the United States if the Federal Government of Somalia were to request support against a terrorist target?
Langley was thoughtful but unequivocal in his response. “That’s what we’re watching. And as we put more pressure on them, there are always indications that they will seek refuge — like you said — refuge somewhere else. And they usually go into poorly governed areas.”
“We’re talking about 11.2 million square miles on the continent of Africa. But they [ISIS operatives] see where there’s instability — and where we’re not.”
Langley’s remarks made clear that Africom’s actions in Somalia are not reactive — they are based on a strategic calculation that ISIS in Somalia poses the most direct threat to US national security interests. The command’s focus, therefore, remains squarely on pre-empting those threats through a combination of intelligence, targeted strikes, and collaboration with Somali partners.
Geopolitical contestation across Africa
From the Horn, our conversation expanded to consider the broader geopolitical contest unfolding across the continent. I asked General Langley about Russian and Chinese influence — specifically, how their military and quasi-military presence has evolved in Africa over the past year, and what challenges this poses to Africom’s posture and partnerships.
Langley addressed the structural shift within Russia’s foreign military apparatus following the demise of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. “They took the holistic structure of Wagner and subsumed it into the Russian MoD [Ministry of Defence],” he said. “What came out of that was a structure called the Africa Corps — or the Expeditionary Corps. Different lexicons on how to identify them.”
He described the rebranded force as a more formalised extension of the Russian state, contrasting it with Wagner’s earlier profit-driven, extractive model.
“Wagner was usually going into countries and looking for direct exchange or mining concessions. But now, it’s more structured.” That structure, he said, is still active across several African states.
“Yes, they’re still present. They’ve changed somewhat in CAR [Central African Republic], but they’re resident also up in Libya. And then across the Sahel — you know, definitely so in Mali and, to some degree, in Niger.”
I pressed him on whether Russia was reconfiguring its logistics networks in Africa after losing access to key positions in Syria. Langley confirmed that Africom continues to monitor this.
On China, Langley explained that Beijing is attempting to fill strategic gaps left by shifting US engagement models. He referenced China’s evolving Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which now includes a more explicit security dimension.
“The Chinese Communist Party is on the fringes of Belt and Road Initiative implementation,” he said. “If we remember back last September at the [Forum on China-Africa Cooperation], they said, ‘We’re going to move forward into the security realm, and we’re going to be the security providers to a number of […] African countries that are willing.’”
Langley warned that Beijing’s strategy is designed to appeal to African governments seeking external support — but that the nature and quality of that support differs significantly from Africom’s model. “It’s not the same quality. It’s not the same values. But they want to try to leverage that in trying to do security — deepening partnerships with these African countries.”
What emerged clearly from this part of our exchange is that great power competition in Africa is no longer abstract. It is being fought through formalised security contracts, disinformation, economic inducements, and, in some cases, boots on the ground — both uniformed and deniable.
Yet despite the pressures, Langley consistently framed Africom’s approach as one grounded in transparency, professionalism, and African sovereignty. That, he implied, is what will differentiate the United States in the long run.
Africa matters to US national security
As our conversation neared its end, I asked Langley a question he has encountered many times on Capitol Hill and in policy forums: Why does Africa matter to the American homeland?
He did not hesitate.
“The terrorist networks are a threat to the homeland,” he stated plainly. “In the progress to get to stability and prosperity of these African countries, it’s the same thing for the United States as well.”
Langley explained that Africom’s mission — often misunderstood in various corners of the world — has always been rooted in shared objectives with African partners. From countering transnational terrorism to strengthening security institutions, the work Africom does across the continent is directly linked to the protection of US national security.
“We want to work toward something that’s mutually beneficial — for your country as well as ours,” he emphasised. “We’re clear-eyed and clear-focused on that goal.”
He spoke with conviction about the future of Africa — not as a battleground for global competition, but as a continent of potential. His outlook was grounded in respect.
“They [African countries] know their potential. They want us to respect their sovereignty, treat them as equal partners — and that’s what we have been doing the last three years.”
When I asked what kind of report card he believed he had earned after nearly three years in command, Langley’s response was measured — but confident. “We have moved the needle — especially in the African countries. And African militaries know that they can take these challenges head-on and be able to communicate to the civilian leadership that they can establish stability, they can establish security, and set the stage to increase their economic viability; to hit prosperity on the global stage.”
That is the legacy Langley leaves behind at Africom: one of dignity, humility, and clarity of mission. Under his leadership, the command remained engaged — not imposed. It became more deliberate, not diminished. And it earned trust by staying focused on what mattered most: partnerships, professionalism, and the defence of shared security.
Pearl Matibe is a Washington, DC-based geopolitical analyst and correspondent with expertise in foreign policy and international security, regularly covering the Pentagon and White House. Follow her on X (Twitter): @PearlMatibe.
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